

# THE BUGLE

## BALTDEFCOL NEWSLETTER



September '09 Nr. 3

### BALTDEFCOL shows its academic nature



Moment from “Workshop on Russian Security Policy: Present and Future” from June, 2009  
(photo: Mr Oliver Toots)

*Mr Villu Varjas*

**I**N the following months the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) will host several academic workshops and seminars. The start was already given with the Information Warfare and Cyber Terrorism seminar held on 8-10 September.

During the three days topics such as the approaches of different international state and non-state actors and the legal aspects of these concepts were taken under discussion. Also a closer look on the future trends of information warfare was given.

On the first day of October starts a 2-day seminar “Strategies of Energy Suppliers and Consumers: Search for Consensus”. The main attention of the seminar falls on energy policy of the Baltic States, role of alternative solutions and scientific inno-

vations, and the relationships between suppliers and consumers.

When the seminars are mainly directed to the students then in exactly two weeks time, on 15-16 October the turn goes to a bigger event, an academic workshop on the subject of the NATO Strategic Concept and its impact to the Baltic Region. Panel discussions cover such subjects as the future of NATO nations’ force structures, engagement strategies, relations with PFP countries, new military doctrines, national procurement strategies, threat assessments, and national strategic visions.

The series will be ended with the workshop on military history of the Baltic region on 3-4 November. The intent of the workshop is to look at Baltic Region military history in the broadest sense—from analyzing battles and campaigns to discussing the social and economic impact of conflicts. Broad is also the timeline covered by the workshop, the subjects for presentations and panels deal with Baltic military history from the crusades of 1200 to current conflicts.

For more information on the seminars and workshops visit the BALTDEFCOL webpage [www.bdcoll.ee](http://www.bdcoll.ee).

#### Schedule of events

- 08-10.09—Seminar: Information Warfare and Cyber Terrorism
- 01- 02.10—Seminar: Strategies of Energy Suppliers and Consumers: Search for Consensus
- 15-16.10—NATO Strategic Concept Workshop
- 03- 04.11—Baltic Region Military History Workshop

#### Special points of interest:

- Acting Course Director LtCol (ret.) Ron LaGrone’s introduction to JCGSC 2009/2010 (p. 4)
- Interview with Col Zdzislaw Sliwa about studying in China (p. 5)
- Student essay on Russia’s policy towards Baltic States (p. 7)
- LtCol Harri Ints introduces current trends in military psychology (p. 12)

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Est. 2009

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## Commandant's greeting



*BrigGen Gundars Abols  
Commandant*

**IT** is my great pleasure to welcome you all to the BALTDEFCOL at the start of the new academic year 2009/2010.

The second half of this year will be a time of reflection and preparation for the JCGSC 2009/2010 as well as for the HCSC 2009. Let me wish you many good ideas, enthusiasm and understanding at this important stage of developing our College. I have no doubt whatsoever that the current courses will be as successful as the previous ones, and I am confident they will be most enjoyable learning experience for its students.

## Battle of Cesis 1919: Battlefield Orientation Tour

[www.bdccl.ee](http://www.bdccl.ee)

**IN** June 2009 the BALTDEFCOL's Operations Department conducted a battlefield orientation tour for the professional development of directing staff.

The tour examined the events of the Battle of Cesis (Võnnu, Wenden) 19-23 June 1919, of which the ninetieth anniversary is this year. In the Battle of Cesis, Estonian and Latvian troops under the command of Gen Ernst Põdder defeated German forces of Gen Rüdiger von der Goltz. Study of the battle provided good examples of the problems of operational art, planning and leadership as well as serving to sharpen terrain appreciation of Operations Department members.

The tour also strived to provide a better understanding of the broader implications of the Battle of Cesis 1919 and deepen understanding regional history and national social and political outlook

I would hereby particularly like to welcome our new staff members and their families. I hope that your settling down in Tartu and integration into the community will be seamless. Tartu is a great place to live and work and I am convinced that your time in Tartu will widen your personal horizon, not only in the military field but to give you the fondest memories.

I hope that you all had a good summer rest after an intensive and demanding previous school year, and are all looking forward to meeting new challenges and opportunities that the new year is about to bring.

among the directing staff. The Latvian War Museum helped greatly to facilitate the tour. As part of the visit to Cesis, directing staff were treated to a tour of the Cesu Brewery.



**Participants had a chance to test their topographical skills** (photo: Dr Eric Sibul)

## In brief

### • Changes in staff

**IN** August 2009 besides the new students, the BALTDEFCOL welcomed new members to the staff. The biggest addition went to Operations Department with three new members – Col (ret.) Risto Gabrielsson (Finland), Col Zdzislaw Sliwa (Poland) and LtCol Sam Casmus (USA).

Department of Management and Officership got two new members – new Head of Department LtCol Mika Juha Kerttunen (Finland) and CDR Annes Vainamäe (Estonia).

For the support staff the most prominent change was the creation of a new post for HNS and Protocol Support issues which was manned with MSG Hannele Tilk (Estonia).

### • New dormitories

**IN** the summer, when most of the BALTDEFCOL staff was on vacation, the Estonian Ministry of Defence disclosed that from February 2010 the students and lecturers of the BALTDEFCOL will be accommodated in two new housing facilities in Narva Road and Peetri street in Tartu.

New houses are rented as the first Public-Private Partnership of the ministry, meaning they will not be owned by the ministry, but all the facilities including services to maintain them are rented from private sector.

Moving to new and more modern living conditions should make the College also more attractive as a studying environment.

Till now students have been living mostly at the Taru Hotel, but it is depreciated and both construction-wise and economically unsuitable as a dormitory.

More information and photos will be coming up in the next issues of The Bugle.

Source: ([www.kmin.ee](http://www.kmin.ee))

## Master's degree from BALTDEFCOL

Mr Frederic Labarre

**SINCE** the arrival of the new Dean, Dr James Corum, the College has created the possibility for students who desire to engage in Masters' studies. The programme will be officially unveiled once all the requisite licenses will have been obtained. As this is the first time that such a programme is delivered at BALTDEFCOL, glitches are expected, but they are susceptible to being ironed out rapidly.

This MA is by no means obligatory for our students, but some nations strongly encourage their officers in getting post-graduate education in a field of their choice. Not only does this help complete the general educational development of an individual, but it also shields military officers from the negative consequences of sudden career changes. The travails of countries transitioning from a conscript to a professional army are well-known. Less well-known are the effects on the personnel that is relieved of its functions or made redundant. There, the psycho-social consequences can be disastrous,

especially in armed forces with large force structures.

The Baltic States do not face problems of this magnitude, but for those Baltic officers that opt out of a military career after being commissioned from the rank for a certain number of years, the prospect of getting an MA sanctioned by an accredited institution may be attractive for a career change. Evidently, this program is not exclusive to Baltic students, and all are encouraged to participate.

In addition this program creates new stakeholders in cooperation with the BALTDEFCOL. For the purpose of accreditation of this MA program, the Latvian Military Academy is partnering with the BALTDEFCOL to grant equivalence to the students desiring to pursue an MA through our College.

At present, two courses are being offered: one – Military Theory – was created by Dr Eric Sibul and is being offered in cooperation with the Dean, Dr James Corum. The other – Strategic Thought – was created by Mr Frederic Labarre, and is being taught with LtCol Dr Mika Juha Kerttunen, one of the

College's new staff seconded from Finland, and Mr Frederic Labarre.

Both courses are available through onsite seminars in the evenings at the BALTDEFCOL, and alternate between seminar leaders. For example, Strategic Thought will be delivered one week by LtCol Kerttunen, and another by Mr Labarre. Each week, the students have substantial readings to prepare, with no less than 75 pages to read. The courses are run for 13 weeks (a normal semester) and in combination with a thesis, amount to a formal MA. In addition, the students are graded on their participation and the quality of the work provided. They have two thematic reviews to deliver, one paper proposal and one large paper of 5000 words.

In addition to the Diploma Supplement delivered at every end of course, the BALTDEFCOL continues leading the way towards fulfilment of Bologna Process principles.

## Editor of BALTFORT in Tartu

Mr Villu Varjas

**ON** 6 August the editor of BALTFORT magazine Mr. Yury Melkonov visited Tartu. The Bugle took the chance to find out more about the magazine. The magazine is published in Riga, Latvia mostly in Russian language, but some articles are also written in English. One of the reasons for choosing the publishing language to be Russian is according to Mr Melkonov the lack of literature about the military history of the Baltic region in Russian language.

The other aspect that distinguishes BALTFORT from other magazines is that when others in-

clude news and military information and not so much military history, then the proportion of pages dedicated to military information in BALTFORT has a reducing tendency with history pushing forward.

The publication is financed solely by Mr Melkonov himself. Since there are no fees foreseen for



photo: [www.melkon.lv](http://www.melkon.lv)

the articles then they are written mainly by enthusiasts of war history. That also means that both the time spectrum covered in the journal and the variety of topics is wide. A fine example is Mr Melkonov himself who is specialized in coastal artillery. Although history of the Baltic States has strong competing narratives, the feedback to the magazine has been neutral the editor says.

BALTFORT magazine as well as other books written by Mr Melkonov can be found in the BALTDEFCOL library and in Krisostomus bookstore.

## JCGSC 2009/2010 is underway!

*LtCol (ret.) Ron LaGrone*

**THE** installation of 51 officers as students in the Joint Command and General Staff Course (JCGSC) 2009/2010 is complete and the course is underway. Thanks to the hard summer work of the Course Office and the extremely dedicated College Support Staff, our students arrived here with travel orders, little border hassles, a place to live, improved syndicate rooms, and a good introduction to life in Tartu.

The English language test always serves to test both the students and our abilities at the College. We are pleased to report that we only had one loss due to a language deficiency, but several students were required to take the test more than once. With the complexity of the course, all students would be advised to make constant efforts to improve their English abilities as this effort will definitely pay off when we enter the demanding worlds of Contemporary Strategy and Combined Joint Task Force planning.

In addition to the Baltic States, JCGSC students from NATO and NATO Partnership for Peace countries include attendees from Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Georgia, Germany, Macedonia, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Ukraine, and the United States. Over half of the students are very familiar with the College having graduated from a previous Army Intermediate Command and Staff Course within the last two years. Those AICSC graduates are a great resource for the College Staff and their fellow students as they know how to get things done here and are passing that knowledge on to others.

At present with the preliminaries completed, the Students are currently taking on the requirements of Military Theory in week 935 which is the first "heavy" week of the course plan. The 11 month course is divided into five learning areas. These learning areas are

taught by the three College departments.

Learning Area 1 or Joint Combined Operations is the first among equals counting for the majority of JCGSC hours within one heading. LA1 is taught mainly by the staff of the Department of Operations led by Col Kristian Ekroll the head of the department. Learning Areas 2 and 5, International Security and Strategy and Academic Writing are delivered by Mr Frederic Labarre's Department of Political and Security Studies. The Department's responsibility also includes the supervision of an Individual Study Paper which is the main product of the Academic Writing learning area. The Department also organizes

engagement in the Baltic region or the name of a noteworthy military commander. All syndicates are assigned a Syndicate Guiding Officer or SGO. The SGO bears the dual responsibility for both ensuring that the Course is delivered well to each student, and also providing a fair assessment of the officer's performance during the course and potential for future service as field grade commanders, national level staff officers, and members of international staffs such as NATO. The SGOs have other teaching and national duties in addition to their main responsibilities easily making them the hardest working and most significant members of the BALTDEFCOL team.



**Students of JCGSC 2009/2010** (photo: Mr Oliver Toots)

several seminars attended by our students, visiting academics, and government officials from other institutions. The Department of Defence Management and Officership led by LtCol Mika Juha Kerttunen teaches Defence Planning as well as Professionalism, Leadership, Ethics, and Management which are Learning Areas 3 and 4 respectively. DMO is also responsible for managing each student officer's overall assessment for participation in Course activities.

The students are organized into 6 syndicates with 8-9 officers each. Each syndicate has a unique name which reflects a significant military

Profound relief will be in the air for all staff, the students, and their families on 18 June 2010. On that graduation day, if tradition holds, those leaving will wax nostalgic about the charms of Tartu, claim their hard won diplomas and distinctive insignia, bid respectful but eager farewells to the Staff, and put the BALTDEFCOL into the rear-view mirror. Until that day, which will be here before you know it, we of the College staff are looking forward to making our already impressive group of officers even better.

## HCSC 2009 is running smoothly

*LtCol Harri Ints*

**THE** Higher Command Studies Course started (HCSC) as scheduled on August 10. This year the course is attended by 14 students from 11 countries. In addition to traditional three Baltic countries there are students from Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. It means that we can add three new flags - Czech, French and Romanian - to the HCSC flag set. There are 4 MoD civil servants at-

tending the course. It is also good to note that there are two ladies in the course.

The course started traditionally with teambuilding events during the first week and we had excellent opportunity to listen to the remarks of the NATO Supreme Allied James N. Mattis on NATO Transformation via VTC on August 12 and students had good discussion during Q&A session with the SACT. Another highlight of the course so far was a lecture by the former Danish Chief of Defence

Gen (ret.) Hans Jesper Helsø. He kindly agreed to share with the class his insights on strategic leadership.

We expect that the HCSC 2009 will proceed in the same manner and spirit as it started. We hope our students will receive from the course as much as possible.

## Chinese National Defence University through student's eyes

**ONE** of the BALTDEFCOL's new staff members Col Zdzislaw Sliwa before coming to Tartu passed a course in the Chinese National Defence University (NDU) in the Centre of Defence Studies (CDS) located in Beijing. The Bugle asked him to share the oriental experience with our readers.

**What was the main difference between the Chinese university where you studied and a traditional western defence college?**

Well, it is not an easy question, because China is changing. China as a country and Chinese forces are changing and they are trying to pick up as many western ideas as possible, but they are very colourful in making corrections.

Regarding the way of teaching, generally, the college was not so different from west European facilities because we had typical lectures, syndicate discussions and papers, which were obligatory for each module, and a final paper — in that sense typical education is provided.

The main visible difference in many cases was the fact that lectures were provided thought interpreter and in some cases there was problem with them, as the quality of interpretation was not very good. We had also some qualified

interpreters with no language problems, so altogether, it was a small problem.

It is necessary to remember that the NDU is a top level military establishment in the country. And what is important, we had not so much interaction with Chinese students.

**So you did not have any lectures together with Chinese students?**

We were only an international group. When here in the BALTDEFCOL it is possible to have people from different countries, including the host nation, in the staff group making it easier to understand and learn about the country then there we were, let's say, a bit isolated.

We maybe had one or two meetings with the Chinese students. Of course there was the language barrier. But it was just an official meeting connected with some questions and a very short discussion. But in general we did not have contacts with military students at this level.

**But the lecturers who taught you were the same as the ones who taught the Chinese students?**

Mainly yes. We had some guest teachers. The college is consisted of

campuses. Campus one, which is for Chinese students is located in Beijing, in the centre. We were located in campus three in the centre of defence studies located in another district. The teachers arrived to our CDS from campus 1, so they were providing lectures for both.

**Were the lecturers mainly Chinese or were there also guests from other countries?**

We had mainly Chinese lecturers and not so many guest lecturers.

**As you lived in the campus then how well did you get to know China as a country?**

We were living in the campus — even my family was there. We rented an apartment in the military facility as it was obligatory. However, it was no problem to move outside to see the country.

The first module was connected to introduction of China. So we got basic knowledge about China. History, culture, economy — all aspects of the society — were provided to us during the very first part of our education. This kind of familiarization with the country was quite useful. Additionally, we got some classes of Chinese language, just to make us familiar with Chinese language. Of course it was impossible

to learn it, because the language is complicated and I think it is impossible to learn this language with 2 hours per week.

**Officially China is still a communist country, did you feel it during your stay?**

It is not so visible, when you come from abroad and we had a lot of discussions among students on that topic. The impression was that the Chinese Communist Party controls the country which is to some extent not so bad, according to some of international students as during last 40 years 400 million people were brought out of poverty. They were very poor then. Rural areas are poorer than cities of course, but in general there is no problem with food since the government is subsidising farmers to provide them with better living conditions. However, when we were travelling in China I did not see so many machines working to help farmers. They were mainly working only with their hands or with low-level equipment.

**You also went to more distant parts from Beijing?**

We had so-called field trips. During the first one we went to Shanghai to see this part of the country which is developing very quickly. It was very impressive for foreigners to see such achievements.

With the next trip we were taken to the central part of China – Wuhan, Chengdu and Chongqing. And it was a chance to see the part of China that was not so well developed. However, it was visible that they still are developing. Now one of the main problems is how to balance the well-developed East, less-developed Central China and Western China.

Additionally, there was one trip organized to Xiamen, which is opposite to Taiwan, to see the beauty of China as a whole. During our studies, we saw quite many nice places also in Beijing. For example, it was possible to rent a bus from the college and move outside with no restrictions. However, during

the disturbances in March 2008 in Tibet it was closed for tourists.

In general, being there was quite easy and quite nice. I can bring a nice example of a lady from the Republic of South Africa. When she arrived she was really amazed, because in her country it is impossible to get outside in the evening, because it is extremely dangerous. In China we were walking outside at 10 p.m. or even later without any problem connected with crime or an attack against us. It was really safe.

**When looking back to your stay in China then what was the most valuable experience from the college and the country?**

For me the most important experience was connected to college. It was the first time to work

It was also really nice to see a little different mentality which was represented by these students from Asian and African countries. And it was visible that co-operation between those countries is really making progress.

**As the final question, how do students get to learn in this defence university?**

China is sending invitations to many countries. There are some restrictions connected with political situation meaning that some countries are sending students and some are not. I am not sure, but Poland probably is not sending a student this year, mainly for economical reasons.

The international group consisted of mainly colonels but about one third of us were generals. For example from Sri Lanka we had



**Col Sliwa's graduation from the college** (photo: private collection)

with people from Asian and African countries. I have been studying in the US and of course I had an opportunity to see some Americans also before actually arriving to the US. Working and having discussions with them was a more important experience than trying to see and understand China, because probably we would never fully understand that country, because we are European people.

four 2-star generals, selected by their country. From Afghanistan there was one general. So, it means that co-operation between those countries is really ongoing, because they are sending people from top level of their establishment.

*Interview was conducted by Mr Villu Varjas*

# THE BUGLE

## ACADEMIC WRITING SPECIAL

### Concerns over Russia's policy towards the Baltic States

*Dr Arunas Molis*

**JOINING** NATO and the European Union the Baltic States were hoping that being members of a "big and strong family" they will feel much more secure and confident. There was a hope that NATO's security guarantees and the EU's negotiating power will create an opportunity to feel like an equal partner in relations with a big and powerful state in the East. Umbrella of the membership in transatlantic organizations should have created an opportunity to raise questions and take the decisions that sometimes are uncomfortable for the Kremlin. And do this without being afraid of threatening response. In other words, there was a background to expect, that Russia's behaviour will soften and tensions in our relations with Moscow will lower.

Today one can firmly state that

neither NATO enlargement, nor the EU's negotiating power have altered Russia and its foreign policy in any significant way. Kremlin's officials permanently test the effectiveness of national governments and international organizations to resist their pressure. Cyber attacks against the Estonian and Lithuanian internet portals, economic sanctions against Estonian ports, blockade of Lithuanian transport companies and certain agricultural products together with support for pro-Russian politicians and spread of negative information about the Baltic States are clear evidences of such policy.

Due to an increasingly assertive rhetoric of the Kremlin, BALTDEF-COL students have written a good pile of papers on relations with Russia. Overwhelming majority of writers do not believe that Kremlin and closely with a ruling elite associated business clans will stop dictating political, economic and other condi-

tions to the small countries. Similar mood is felt from the paper of AICSC student MAJ Dainius Kaunas who couples the "Russian return" with the implementation of so-called "Medvedev's doctrine". What makes this paper exceptional is that author manages not only to disclose actual Russian interests towards the Baltic States but also to present and discuss means and mechanisms which Kremlin applies while implementing those interests. Opportunity to react and prevent negative consequences appears only if Kremlin's "agenda" is recognized and properly assessed. Maj. D. Kaunas paper creates a real added value in this regard. Therefore paper is worth to read both for interested academics and professionals.

### Russia's Policy Towards Baltic States

*Maj Dainius Kaunas*

**WHEN** Soviet army was withdrawing from Lithuania in 1993 on the wall of one of the abandoned army barracks a message appeared "we will come back!" After Lithuania and other Baltic countries joined NATO and the EU anyone hardly believes that this might ever happen. In other words, the probability of military aggression from Russia considerably decreased over the last decade.

On the other hand, the intensity of discussions about political, energy and even informational threats has even increased during

the last few years'. Trends which could be qualified as "Russians return" - not with the tanks, but with aggressive investments and energy provision challenges, increasing activity of mass-media financed by Russian government (first of all - TV and radio channels designated specifically to Baltic countries) are clear examples of this trend.

Huge amounts of money under control of Russia-related business companies, frequently not hidden interests rise danger that it could help to control local politicians, governments and, in consequence, threaten our independence. Therefore some analysts express the

opinion that everything happening now in the Baltic countries is nothing else than the implementation of strategy designed by former president Putin - to restore Russia's influence in Central and Eastern European states. On the other hand, others (especially businessmen) believe that we have to be positive about the Russian investments and do not need to worry at all. According to them, Russia's investments are economically based, profitable for us and can hardly imply a threat<sup>2</sup>.

The objective of this argumentative essay is: 1) to analyze what are official and real Russian interests

and goals in the Baltic States (in the first part); 2) to explain what means and mechanisms Russia is willing to exploit towards Baltic States pursuing the implementation of its interest (in the second part).

Because of the limited extent of this essay, there is no intent to discuss such specific uses of Russian hard power as military force demonstration or engagements with Russia in international arena (divergent interests in CIS countries, EU-Russia partnership discussions, the CFE treaty, the Kalinin-grad district militarization etc.).

Preparing the essay multiple sources were used, including theoretical studies by J. S. Nye, F. Halliday, monographs and academic articles by E. Lucas, Z. Brzezinski, J. Bugajski, R. Lopata and other, official documents, statistics data, statements and media reports covering period of the last 3 years.

### **Russia's official policy towards the Baltic States**

In the statement by Russian president D. Medvedev, better known by media-coined term "Medvedev doctrine"<sup>3</sup>, it was stressed that there are regions in "which Russia has privileged interests". No doubt, the Baltic States are considered as one of those "historically related" and "frontier" regions.

The Russian foreign policy concept declares that Russia "is willing" to cooperate with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia<sup>4</sup>. However the "Medvedev doctrine" asserts that Russian citizens and "compatriots" (i. e. Russian speaking minority) rights protection is an "unquestionable priority, on which foreign policy will be based". It is likely that this was stressed seeking to justify once more already occurred Russian military intervention to Georgia and to provide a doctrinal basis for similar actions in the future. However, the statement on interests of Russians "wherever they are" implies application of this principle to the Baltic States as well.

According to the "2000 Round

of population and housing census in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania"<sup>5</sup> Russians amount to 25,6% of residents in Estonia, 29,6% in Latvia and 6,3 % in Lithuania. 12,4% of Estonian residents were with "undetermined citizenship" (i. e. persons who had an alien's passport or persons who asserted that they had not received the document and did not know their citizenship) and 6,3% – citizens of Russia. People without citizenship in Latvia constituted 21,2% of all residents.

It is also noteworthy to pay attention to another statement of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept which stresses Russia's promise "to facilitate the consolidation of Russians organizations, help the Russian Diaspora to preserve its ethnolinguistic identity and its links to the historical homeland"<sup>6</sup>. Simplified order to enter Russia for the residents of Estonia and Latvia without citizenship, support to the education institutions for the Russian-speaking students<sup>7</sup> are pointed as examples of the implementation of those measures.

Nevertheless, is Russia genuinely worried about the Russian minority rights? Some Latvian political commentators believe that despite the fact that the situation of Russian speaking residents in Latvia has not changed substantially during the last decade, the political relationship between Russia and Latvia has visibly improved: a border treaty has been concluded and overall tone of the discussion between two sides has changed.<sup>8</sup>

Russia's military intervention into Georgia case showed that the issue of protection of Russian citizens (in that case living in South Ossetia) might be a pretext to undertake extreme action. However the "Human Rights Watch" reported that Russia itself committed "serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law during the conflict" and "failed to protect civilians in areas under their effective control" in occupied Georgian territories<sup>9</sup>. That and also known the general state of human

rights in contemporary Russia confirm that human rights are not fundamental element in Moscow policy.

Furthermore, J. Bugajski considers that with those emphatic efforts to preserve privileges of Russian-speaking population in Baltic countries Russia believes it is investing in a loyal social and political corpus that will be more amenable in backing Russian state policy<sup>10</sup>.

Finally, some Russian political strategists believe that the protection of Russian minority rights in Baltic countries serve "for consolidation of society"<sup>11</sup> inside Russia itself. The official political accusation on human rights violations or even tolerance of fascism<sup>12</sup> determines quite negative Russian society's perception of the Baltic States.

Thus the issue of minority rights is exploited by Russia to justify pressure against recalcitrant neighbors and for propagandistic purposes - to influence public opinion at home and abroad.

### **Real Russia's interests towards the Baltic States**

If Russia's officially declared interests are not underlying, what are the real ones? American political expert J. Bugajski believes that for Russia the Baltic States are geopolitically vital - as a buffer "against Western encroachment on the former Soviet territories"<sup>13</sup>. It means that Moscow is interested to keep the Baltic States weak, isolated from the West and subservient. Therefore Russia still tries simply to highlight ostentatiously Baltic States persistent existence in Russian sphere of influence. That idea is indirectly supported by R. Lopata: one of the real Russian objectives is to strengthen common cultural interdependency<sup>14</sup> (and, of course, visibility of that).

Furthermore, the Baltic States membership in the NATO and EU increases their political importance for Russia. R. Lopata believes that the Russian goal is to turn the Baltic States into the "agents of influence", through which would be possible



affect the NATO and EU decisions<sup>15</sup>. Thus we can assume that implementation of that projection could eventually turn the Baltic States into the bridgehead of renowned Russian empire to the Europe.

In addition, Russia also has purely economical interests in the Baltic countries. After the Soviet Union collapse Russia lost the most important trade ports in the Baltic (Ventspils, Klaipeda and Tallinn), while the ports under disposition are not convenient by location and lack of special capacities. Therefore, shortage of harbour capacity for Russia will be an acute problem for many years to come<sup>16</sup>. This factor alone could imply the inevitability of Russian interests in Baltic States. According to A. Pikayev, Russia's isolation from warm-water Baltic ports always "invites Moscow's aggressions into the Baltic territories"<sup>17</sup>.

Meanwhile, J. Bugajski is convinced that Russia is seeking to convert monopolistic position in energy supplies and economic investments into long-term and predictable intergovernmental influence.<sup>18</sup> Next we will look into what leverages Russia is exploiting in order to reach those goals.

#### **Expansion of Russian influence: basic instruments**

Theoretically, countries seeking to expend influence can use hard power (military, economic) and soft power<sup>19</sup>. Since the three Baltic countries are members of NATO and EU, Russia's possibilities to expand influence in fact are limited to economic and soft power.

The soft power is seeking to influence other state by attraction<sup>20</sup> - by public diplomacy, spread of pop-culture, etc. Despite the sign indicating Russian preparedness to pursue soft power politics (establishment of the special institution to enhance Russia's image - Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the Administration of

the President in 2005), it is believed that instead this in Russia "the concept of information geopolitics is predominant"<sup>21</sup>. It sees the neighbouring countries as information battlefield and thus Russia tends to use information and communication technologies as hard power tools.

As Russian information geopolitics concept in Baltic countries is rather inefficient (47% of Lithuanian residents believe that Russia is unfriendly towards the Baltic States<sup>22</sup>) further we will discuss the means that Russia exploits towards the Baltic States with most significant impact, specifically - economical and political leverages.

#### **Economical leverages**

J. Nye thinks that a big country's economic power can be embodied into coercion of smaller states - using sanctions and even bribes<sup>23</sup>. Russia's intent to exploit economical leverages (and first of all - energetic) seeking foreign policy goals was openly stated in 2003 when V. Putin approved "the Russian Energy strategy till 2020". Already in the first lines of this document it is stated that Russian "fuel-energetic complex is an instrument carrying foreign policy", and also that the "role of the country in the global energy market is deciding its geopolitical influence"<sup>24</sup>.

The Baltic States' almost complete dependence on Russian gas supplies<sup>25</sup> gives Russia a powerful tool for seeking economical and political goals. Moreover, Russia attempts to expand that dependence by trying to gain control over the key gas and oil infrastructure (pipelines, refineries)<sup>26</sup> by manipulation with oil delivery cuts or gas prices.

In 1998-1999 Russia turned off the supply of oil to Lithuania several times seeking to break Lithuania's negotiations with the US "Williams", so that "Lukoil" could take full control of the country's oil facilities<sup>27</sup>. Finally the oil delivery to Lithuania through "Druzhba" pipeline was

ultimately terminated in 2006 following the sale of "Mažeikių nafta" oil refinery plant to the Polish oil company "PKN Orlen" instead of "Lukoil".<sup>28</sup> The stable work of the latter plant is extremely important for Lithuania: the taxes paid in 2008 (4,5 billion litas) made 19,4% of Lithuania budget incomes.

Similarly, the Latvian oil terminal "Ventspils Nafta" hasn't received any Russian oil by pipeline since 2003. In this case even Russian sources admitted that it was "Transneft" effort to press Latvia seeking to gain exceptional conditions for Russian capital to buy Latvian oil transportation system<sup>29</sup>.

Political analyst of the Jamestown Foundation V. Socor implies that only Russia's desire to maintain its image as reliable gas deliverer to the EU in the wake of gas war with Ukraine prevents the possibility to cut off natural gas delivery to the Baltic countries completely<sup>30</sup>. However, there are plans to start construction of the gas-pipeline "North Stream" underwater across the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany in July 2009 (the pipeline is expected to be functional in 2011-2012). In case of completion of the project the situation might change.

As Professor at the Centre of Energetic Policy of Russian Science Academy A. Chaytun revealed, it is estimated that through the pipeline "North Stream" it would be possible to export just 15% of all Russian exported gas and the transportation through this pipeline is not relevant economically<sup>31</sup>. Therefore, it seems that primary mission of this project could be its utilization as an argument in negotiating conditions of the gas transit through traditional pipelines.

Equally important economical leverage for Russia is pressure to sell to Russian private company transit infrastructure (e.g. the State-owned railway or Klaipeda port facilities in Lithuania). Otherwise Russia menaces to diversify the current Russian goods transit through Baltic ports. How impor-

tant it is for the Baltic States can be illustrated by figures: 52,155 million tons of Russian goods were transported through Latvian ports in 2002 and that composed around 40% of Latvian GDP<sup>32</sup>.

Russian policymakers directly encourage the government to exploit this not only economically, but also politically. Former high ranking official of the Russian MFA and diplomat (by the way, also suspected by Estonian security police as a spy) Mikhail Demurin bluntly pointed that Russia “has an opportunity to exploit interest of “pribalts” in our transit seeking to promote own political interests”<sup>33</sup>.

### Efforts to control political processes

Russia is also trying to influence the Baltic States internal political processes directly. Russian politicians’ indecorous invitations for businessmen of neighbouring country to support financially particular political party could be attributed to open means of influencing. During the Latvian parliamentary elections in 1998 the Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov openly called to support the electoral aspirations of the coalition “For Human Rights in a United Latvia”, promising to cooperate with those businessmen who will support this bloc<sup>34</sup>. In 2002 similar effort was done again: for the same party leader was specially arranged widely advertised meeting with V. Putin.

However, the use of open means to interfere the Baltic States internal policy is rather exceptional. Numerous cases indicate that more hidden efforts to elevate “friendlier” politicians or particular parties are preferred. In Lithuania there are known facts about labour party’s hidden sponsorship in huge sums<sup>35</sup> (supposedly from Russia through intermediate firms), the Russian image-makers involvement into election campaign and sponsoring of later suspended president R. Paksas. Before the presidential election in 2004 one of the leading candidates

even was awarded by Russian patriarch with duchess title.

To ensure the elevation of favourable politicians or simply to bribe them Russia uses technique to establish in Baltic countries intermediate companies which provide funds. For instance, before the Lithuanian parliamentary elections in 2000 Russian capital enterprise “Lukoil Baltija” established a company which funnelled money to various political groups in Lithuania and Latvia. Former the US Ambassador to the Lithuania K. Smith claims that at least two political recipients of “Lukoil” money admitted that they had accepted campaign funds from that firm<sup>36</sup>.

Another noteworthy Russian technique appeared evident in recent years: to fund before parliamentary elections all major political parties through “independent” companies (in Lithuania’s case - gas distributor “Dujotekana”<sup>37</sup>). Moreover, the parliamentary investigation in 2006 disclosed possible “Dujotekana” connections with Russian special services, efforts to influence Lithuanian internal policy and to acquire for Russian capital strategic ventures (state-owned railways, power-station in Kaunas)<sup>38</sup>. However *cause célèbre* was not scrutinized legally so far because of the lack of evidence.

Thus, we can just estimate the Russian special services’ influence extent in our countries. The spy H. Simm case in Estonia indicates once more that they have particular interests in the Baltic States.

### Conclusions

Discussing Russia’s policy towards the Baltic States it is necessary to analyze not only official interests (like Russian speaking minority rights) but also try to ascertain the real Russian goals and exploitable leverages seeking it.

Firstly, question of the status of the Russian-speaking population is hardly the real goal of Moscow. Rather it has to be considered as Russia’s instrument to put pressure

on the Baltic States. Behaving as defender of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries Russia is seeking to shape a loyal social and political group that would be more amenable in backing Russian state policy.

Secondly, the overall Russian goal in the Baltic States is to establish permanent political influence, seeking “more friendly” and controllable regimes in the Baltic States in order to ensure their own economical and political interests in the Baltic region. This could facilitate the Russia possibilities to affect more efficiently transatlantic structures (NATO and EU).

The Baltic States’ membership in NATO and the EU restrains Russian possibilities to use full spectrum of hard powers, however do not hinder the possibility to exploit economical power for political goals and active interference into internal policy affairs. Therefore, Russia tries to expand it’s economical influence in the Baltic States heavily exploiting the Baltic States dependency on energy supply and transit incomes. This might be utilized by Russia in the future even more assertively. On the other hand, Russia continues active direct interference into internal Baltic States policy.

Despite some hopes about Russia becoming more constructive towards the Baltic States<sup>39</sup>, the Russian policy towards them will hardly change in foreseeable future. Consistent public imagining of the Baltic countries as enemies will definitely not help to create a friendly cooperative spirit.

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## Few words about military psychology

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The military psychology can be defined as an application of the psychological principles, methods and knowledge into the specific military environment and so the main task for psychologists, both uniformed and civilian in the military milieu is to provide such an expert know-how to the decision makers in order to help them to make smart and human oriented decisions as much as the commanders are in need. Why? It is because a human being is the most important and, at the same times one of the most vulnerable assets of the military machinery.

Effective use of psychologists in military is like a two-way street: commanders need at least basic and most importantly realistic understanding about what the contemporary psychology is capable of and psychologists need to know and well understand how the military really works. One could say that what we need is a “demythologization” of both psychology science and military business in people’s minds in order to get out the best of such kind of military-psychology union.

If we ask someone to give the first verbal association to the words “military psychology” then probably the first one could be a “dealing with a combat stress reaction or PTSD”. Of course, the theme of stress and psychological support in military operations is the significant and important part of the marriage of military organization and psychologists. It is so important that in NATO RTO has been worked years on the issue. Last year the RTO Technical Report TR-HFM-081 (Stress and Psychological Support in Modern Military Operations) was published and it is a relevant and very good reading material to anybody in the military, not just for commanders and ‘mental health professionals’. However, this seems to be only one part of the game and contemporary psychological science

has much more to offer and psychologists all over the world know it well. Maybe I’m mistaken, but, if it is the case, it seems the question is likely to be in readiness of a military organization (read – people in the military) to take and imply what psychologists have put on the table.

There were published a series of articles about “operational psychology” in the 2006 issues of “Military Psychology”, which is one of the leading scientific magazines of the field. (Staal, Stephenson, 2006). Operational psychology is an emerging sub discipline in psychology, which had revealed itself predominantly within military field of applied science. Some have defined operational psychology as a loose associa-

**“If we ask someone to give the first verbal association to the words “military psychology” then probably the first one could be a “dealing with a combat stress reaction or PTSD””**

tion of skills or disciplines that work outside of the traditional medical model to include survival, evasion, resistance, and escape operations; aircrew performance enhancement and human factors analysis; information operations; organizational cultural assessment; forensic evaluations; special mission unit personnel selection; and so on. (Ibid.) Staal and Stephenson are stressing that term operational psychology does not refer to where or how military psychologists perform their duties. They assert that it requires a paradigm shift in how we have traditionally viewed military psychology and that it relates to the impact that the discipline has on the battlefield. (Ibid.) The operational psychology is the use of psychological principles and skills to improve a commander’s decision making as it pertains to conducting combat and/or related operations.

There are several important factors that distinguish operational

psychology from other forms of psychological practice: (a) psychologist’s position within the chain of command, (b) designation as a combatant versus non-combatant, and (c) psychologist’s impact on combat or related operations. Because operational psychologists do not typically deploy as part of medical unit but rather as a member of a commander’s battle staff, their contributions directly impact the mission through planning, risk management, assessment and selection. (Ibid.)

It is postulated, that the operational psychology falls on an effects-based continuum: on one end of the continuum lies so called traditional medical psychology emphasizing individual emotional and behavioural health care, on the other end lies operational psychology, focused on the application of psychological principles toward a direct influence on combat and related operations. In the middle of these two ends lie several activities performed by military psychologists what contain elements of both sub disciplines. (Ibid.)

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